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Abstract—This paper presents a new technique in preventing 
node cloning attack. The significant contribution of this 
method or technique is in preventing node impersonation 
attack in Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). The new method 
named as Chain Identity Attestation Method (CIA) was 
developed on the basis of Diffie-Hellman hard problem 
algorithm. The exclusivity of CIA method is in the generation 
of node identity. In this method, the node identity is in each 
session. In other words, node identity is no longer fixed to a 
certain value. Perfect forward secrecy attack model is used to 
prove the security of this CIA method. 
 
Index Terms—Node Identity; Node Impersonation; Trusted 
Sensor Node; Wireless Sensor Network. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A WSNs system incorporates a gateway that provides 
wireless connectivity back to the wired environment and 
distributed nodes. The nature of the sensor nodes that are 
located remotely and unattended has exposed itself to the 
node cloning attack. Node cloning attacks can be further 
classified into physical attack where the nodes are removed 
from their locations and being duplicated in the lab. The 
cloned nodes will then be placed at the original node 
locations to get access to the network. These cloned nodes 
will be programmed to report or to provide false messages 
to the base station. It will then result in invalid data and 
reaction. Another type of node cloning attack is node 
impersonation. If the base station or the communication 
network depends merely on the identity, the impersonated 
nodes will be able to join the network and will cause false or 
invalid data transmission to the network. This type of threat 
will also interfere with the trust management system in 
deciding trusted sensor nodes in the wireless sensor 
network. 
This paper presents a new method in generating the 
identity for the sensor node to prevent node impersonation 
in the wireless sensor network. In this implementation, the 
identity of the sensor node will be different in each 
communication.   The identity will be developed using 
Diffie-Hellman hard problem equation and in the form of 
chain identity. The aim of this method is to generate a chain 
of unique identity of the sensor node.  
 
II. MOTIVATION 
 
This work aims to mitigate node impersonation attack in 
the WSN environment or any embedded devices that 
demand unique identity.  Consideration on the limitation of 
the sensor node or embedded devices such as limited power 
and processing capabilities has been taken into account 
throughout the designed process.   
 
A. Objectives  
The objective of this work is to develop a new technique 
in mitigating node impersonation attack. The idea is to have 
a chain of identity that uniquely identifies a specific sensor 
node. This technique will then be verified using Perfect 
Forward Secrecy attack model. 
 
B. Target Application 
The method developed is suitable for any embedded 
device that demands identity, such as applications involving 
e-health, e-transport, and many more. This method allows 
member in the network to authenticate with each other using 
different identity.  
 
III. RELATED WORKS 
 
This section discusses related work in the area of node 
cloning. It highlights the study on the node cloning followed 
by sequence of techniques in mitigating node cloning. The 
method used by Capkun et al. [5] is to check vulnerabilities 
in node positioning that ultimately aims to provide secure 
network. They found out that the distance estimation and 
bounding techniques are also very effective to secure the 
network from malicious attacker and dishonest node. This 
work identifies positions with capabilities of vulnerability. 
M. Ding [6] presents his works on fault sensor identification 
and fault-tolerant event boundary detection. However, 
current algorithms are sensitive to the settings of thresholds. 
Both works aforementioned utilized simulation technique. 
Researcher in Kyasanur [7] on the other hand, modify IEEE 
802.11 MAC protocol that simplifies detection of such 
selfish host and also a correction scheme for this 
misbehaviour. The correction they proposed is effective in 
restricting the selfish nodes to a fair share. 
On the other hand, K. Xing in [8] has implemented his 
study in real time. In this research, a base station is used to 
protect the network from the clone node. The base station 
will collect the information from all sensors in the network. 
This method results in high communication overhead 
especially when the base station requests information from 
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the sensor nodes in the network. However, the clone node 
can still send the data from the original node and thus the 
base station still fail to identify the cloned node. In [9], they 
proposed an elliptic curve discrete logarithm and bilinear 
pairing for their secure signature scheme. In their work, the 
secret key is associated with an identity and the signer just 
uses the current secret key with ID to sign the message, 
which is more practical.  
Another work presented in [11] utilised trusted third party 
where each group will establish connection by 
communicating through a trusted third party. In this paper, a 
novel group key management scheme is proposed with 
perfect forward secrecy. The goal of this paper is to prevent 
any key exchange from being compromised among n-
parties, who shares a common secret over an insecure 
network. Wu proposed an efficient smart card-oriented 
remote login authentication scheme. In [12] paper, they have 
drawn the attention to the weakness of Wu's system by 
demonstrating authentication request, replaying an 
eavesdropped message, and different attack schemes on 
deriving secret data from the eavesdropped messages. The 
analysis shows that our modified scheme can withstand all 
possible attacks while keeping its efficiency. 
Then [13] proposed two novel node clone detection 
protocols with different trade-offs on network conditions 
and performance. The first one is based on a distributed hash 
table, which forms a Chord overlay network and provides 
the key-based routing, caching, and checking facilities for 
clone detection. Whilst the second one uses probabilistic 
directed technique to achieve efficient communication 
overhead for satisfactory detection probability. The DHT-
based protocol provides high level security for all kinds of 
sensor networks by one deterministic witness, additional 
memory-efficiency, probabilistic witnesses, and the 
randomly directed exploration presents outstanding 
communication performance and minimal storage 
consumption for dense sensor networks. In [14] they 
proposed a secure dynamic ID-based remote user 
authentication scheme for the multi-server environment 
using smart cards and claimed that their scheme could 
protect against masquerade attacks, server spoofing attack, 
registration server spoofing attack and insider attack. They 
presented the cryptanalysis scheme that specified and 
analysed the proposed dynamic identity-based remote user 
authentication scheme for multi-server architecture using 
smart cards.  
From the multitude of studies described above, there are 
numerous methods aim to prevent node cloning attack. Each 
of them comes with their own strengths and weaknesses. 
Based on the review of the latest work, this paper presents a 
new technique in mitigating node cloning in wireless sensor 
network, called the Chain Identity Attestation (CIA) 
method. 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
 
We have begun our research by conducting literature 
review. We have derived our hypothesis from the previous 
work done on node cloning issues in wireless sensor 
network and the method developed to prevent node cloning. 
From the previous studies, issues arise from node cloning 
are investigated and the flaws of the previous methodologies 
used are identified. Node cloning is the most common 
problem in WSN due to security leak in the communication. 
The adversary can capture packet or data when a sensor 
node transmitting or receiving the packet. After that the 
adversary will act as a real node to join as legitimate sensor 
node in the WSN. Thorough review demonstrated that the 
leak of the security protocol is the main problem. The 
attacker can interrupt the protocol during communication, 
which warrants the enhancement and reinforcement of the 
security protocol. CIA is one of the methods to prevent node 
cloning. During the formulation of CIA, the trusted base 
station is required to store all of the information. In CIA, the 
identity on the protocol will always change in every session. 
It is important to change the data to keep the information 
secured from any attacker. Since the data is always 
changing, the unique identity is restored inside the node to 
make it different from others. Moreover, all the changes are 
independent of each other. After CIA formulation, adversary 
model is used to verify the CIA. It is to prove that the CIA is 
valid on preventing node cloning in wireless sensor.  
 
V. CHAIN IDENTITY ATTESTATION METHOD (CIA) 
 
This section will explain on the Chain Identity Attestation 
Method and how the CIA protects the system from the 
attackers. figure 1 shows the first stage of CIA method. First 
stage is done during offline mode and Unique Identity is 
embedded inside each sensor node. The root of the identity 
is assumed to be trusted and it is suggested to be kept in a 
secure encryption memory location. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Generation of Root Identity 
 
The second stage is the communication stage. In this 
stage, all nodes will start to communicate with each other. 
Both nodes will communicate and exchange their identities. 
Figure 2 shows the equation involves during node 
communication. In each session, the identity will be 
changed in order to avoid node impersonation attack. In 
CIA, the session identity is computed from its own previous 
identity, thus been regarded as Chain Identity Attestation 
(CIA). To keep this Identity from being exposed to any 
adversary, every session identity is required to be hashed.  
In CIA, the identity for both parties will be changed in 
each session but will depend on the previous data. The 
session identity is independent and cannot be exposed to 
others. It is important to keep the session identity private 
from the environment.  Since the session identity depends 
on the session private identity for each session, the session 
private identity and unique identity cannot be measured. It is 
because of the session identity has been hashed. By hashing 
the session identity, we can protect the unique identity from 
the attacker even though they are aware of the previous 
information.  
Next stage is the verification part. In this stage, both 
nodes are required to be verified by a common protocol in 
order to communicate with the trusted node. Figure 3 shows 
the method of CIA doing their verification for clone node or 
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trusted node. If the verification process is successful, it will 
pass to the next session but if the verification does not 
match, the node will reject to communicate with the other 
node. This verification process will repeat for each session 
of the communication.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: CIA computes during session communicate 
 
 
 
Figure 3: CIA verification session during communicate 
 
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
The proposed CIA method is verified using perfect 
forward attack model, a mathematically-proven method. 
Perfect forward secrecy attack model consists of four 
sections which are: 
 
A. Session State Reveal Attack 
An adversary (e.g.   cannot compute session   because the 
root identity   is not accessible to the adversary. The 
adversary manages to know and   but it cannot compute   
because   is unknown. A formalism of the adversary model 
are: 
 
Adversary model: Session state revel attack 
Public knowledge:𝑃𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖 , 𝐴𝑖 , 𝐵𝑖 . 
Leaked secret knowledge: 𝒂𝒊, 𝒃𝒊  
Adversary limitation: The adversary cannot access secret 
parameters𝑎𝑈𝐼𝐷, 𝑏𝑈𝐼𝐷, 𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇 because they were embedded in the sensor 
nodes during installation. 
We assume that the adversary cannot access or tamper physical sensor 
nodes. 
Adversary goal: To find 𝐼𝐷𝑖=1 or 𝐼𝐷𝑖+1   
Adversary computation:  
To find 𝐼𝐷𝑖=1, Let i=1: 
𝑃𝑖 , 𝑔  𝑖 , 𝐴𝑖 , 𝐵𝑖 , 𝐼𝐷𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ∈  ℤ𝑛=2048 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠
∗  
𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇 ∈  ℤ𝑛=𝑆𝐻𝐴3_256 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 
Either: 
𝐼𝐷𝑖 =  𝐴𝑖
𝒃𝒊  𝑔𝑖
ID𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖) or 
𝐼𝐷𝑖 =  𝐵𝑖
𝒂𝒊  𝑔𝑖
ID𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖) 
Computes: 
𝐼𝐷𝑖
′ =  [𝐴𝑖
𝑏𝑖] 𝑔𝑖
ID𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖) 
1 
When 𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇 is unknown, a probability to find the correct 𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇 using 
brute force is 
1
2256
 such that 𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝐼𝐷𝑖
′. 
To find 𝐼𝐷𝑖=𝑖+1, Let: 
𝑃𝑖+1, 𝑔𝑖+1, 𝐴𝑖+1, 𝐵𝑖+1, 𝐼𝐷𝑖+1, 𝑎𝑖+1, 𝑏𝑖+1 ∈  ℤ𝑛=2048 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠
∗  
𝐼𝐷𝑖 ∈  ℤ𝑛=𝑆𝐻𝐴3_256 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 
Either: 
𝐼𝐷𝑖+1 =  𝐴𝑖+1
𝒃𝒊+𝟏 𝑔𝑖+1
ID𝑖̅̅ ̅̅̅(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖+1) or 
𝐼𝐷𝑖+1 =  𝐵𝑖+1
𝒂𝒊+𝟏 𝑔𝑖+1
ID𝑖̅̅ ̅̅̅(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖+1) 
Computes: 
𝐼𝐷𝑖+1
′ =  [𝐴𝑖+1
𝑏𝑖+1] 𝑔𝑖+1
ID𝑖̅̅ ̅̅̅(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖+1) 
When 𝐼𝐷𝑖 is unknown, a probability to find the correct 𝐼𝐷𝑖 using brute 
force is 
1
2256
 such that 
𝐼𝐷𝑖+1 = 𝐼𝐷𝑖+1
′. 
Security assumption: 1) Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem 
is hard in a cyclic group 𝐺 and 2) hash function is a universal one-way 
hash function with strong collision-resistant (Mohd Anuar Mat Isa et al., 
2015). 
Security argument: The session 𝐼𝐷𝑖 is secure against the session state 
revel attack if and only if the adversary 𝐴 is not able to find 
𝐼𝐷𝑖+1 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝐼𝐷𝑖+1 =  𝐼𝐷𝑖+1
′ with negligible advantage. 
 
1 The symbol [ ] shows that a given algebra is computable by an adversary. 
 
B. Forward Secrecy 
If the adversary manages to know the previous session 
secrets identity, they still cannot compute the current session 
key. When adversary manages to know the identity 
parameter session previously in   and   but cannot compute 
because of the current session on   are unknown, the 
formulated of adversary model as below: 
 
Adversary model: Forward secrecy 
Public knowledge:𝑃𝑖−1, 𝑔𝑖−1, 𝑃𝑖, 𝑔𝑖 , 𝐴𝑖 , 𝐵𝑖 . 
Leaked secret knowledge: 𝒂𝒊−𝟏, 𝒃𝒊−𝟏, 𝑰𝑫𝒊−𝟏 
Adversary limitation: Adversary cannot access the secret identity 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 
because the Protocol data is protected using hashing measurements. 
Adversary goal: To find current session  𝐼𝐷𝑖  
Adversary computation:  
To find 𝐼𝐷𝑖=2, Let i=2: 
𝑃𝑖−1, 𝑔𝑖−1, 𝐴𝑖−1, 𝐵𝑖−1, 𝐼𝐷𝑖−1, 𝑎𝑖−1, 𝑏𝑖−1 ∈  ℤ𝑛=2048 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠
∗  
𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇 ∈  ℤ𝑛=𝑆𝐻𝐴3_256 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 
Either: 
𝐼𝐷𝑖 =  𝐴𝑖
𝒃𝒊  𝑔𝑖
ID𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖)  or 
𝐼𝐷𝑖 =  𝐵𝑖
𝒂𝒊  𝑔𝑖
ID𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖) 
Computes: 
 [𝐼𝐷𝑖−1] =  𝐴𝑖−1
𝑏𝑖−1𝑔𝑖−1
𝐼𝐷𝑖−2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑖−1) 
[𝐼𝐷𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅] = 𝐻(𝐼𝐷𝑖) 
𝐼𝐷𝑖
′ =  𝐴𝑖
𝒃𝒊  𝑔𝑖
[𝐼𝐷𝑖−1]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖)  
When 𝑏𝑖 is unknown, a probability to find the correct 𝐼𝐷𝑖 using brute force 
is 
1
22048
 such that 𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝐼𝐷𝑖
′. 
Security assumption: 1) Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem 
is hard in a cyclic group 𝐺 and 2) hash function is a universal one-way 
hash function with strong collision-resistant (Mohd Anuar Mat Isa et al., 
2015). 
Security argument: The session 𝐼𝐷𝑖 is secure against the forward secrecy 
attack if and only if the adversary 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵 is not able to find 
𝐼𝐷𝑖  𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝐼𝐷𝑖 =  𝐼𝐷𝑖
′ with negligible advantage 
 
C. Key Independence 
Based on the forward secrecy model, the session identity 
is protected even though the adversary manages to discover 
the previous session parameters. This is because the session 
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identity is computed independently from all of the previous 
session information. Even when the adversary manages to 
attack one session identity using the previous information, it 
still cannot be used because the previous session identity 
cannot be reused. Formulations of the adversary model are 
as described below: 
 
Adversary model: Key independence (or session independence) 
Adversary knowledge:𝑃𝑖−1, 𝑔𝑖−1, 𝑃𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖 , 𝐴𝑖 , 𝐵𝑖 .  
Leaked secret knowledge: 𝒂𝒊−𝟏, 𝒃𝒊−𝟏, 𝑰𝑫𝒊−𝟏,  
Adversary limitation: Adversary cannot access the identity parameter 
𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 because the Protocol data is protected using hashing measurements. 
Adversary goal: To find 𝐼𝐷𝑖 from 𝐼𝐷𝑖−1 
Adversary computation:  
To find 𝐼𝐷𝑖=1, Let i=1: 
𝑃𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖 , 𝐴𝑖 , 𝐵𝑖 , 𝐼𝐷𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ∈  ℤ𝑛=2048 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠
∗  
𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇 ∈  ℤ𝑛=𝑆𝐻𝐴3_256 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 
Either: 
𝐼𝐷𝑖 =  𝐴𝑖
𝒃𝒊  𝑔𝑖
ID𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖) or 
𝐼𝐷𝑖 =  𝐵𝑖
𝒂𝒊  𝑔𝑖
ID𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖) 
Computes: 
[𝐼𝐷𝑖
′] =  [𝐴𝑖
𝑏𝑖] 𝑔𝑖
ID𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖)  
When 𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇 is unknown, a probability to find the correct 𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇 using 
brute force is 
1
22048
 such that 𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝐼𝐷𝑖
′. 
To find 𝐼𝐷𝑖=2, Let i=2: 
𝑃𝑖−1, 𝑔𝑖−1, 𝐴𝑖−1, 𝐵𝑖−1, 𝐼𝐷𝑖−1, 𝑎𝑖−1, 𝑏𝑖−1 ∈  ℤ𝑛=2048 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠
∗  
𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇 ∈  ℤ𝑛=𝑆𝐻𝐴3_256 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 
Either: 
𝐼𝐷𝑖 =  𝐴𝑖
𝒃𝒊  𝑔𝑖
ID𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖)  or 
𝐼𝐷𝑖 =  𝐵𝑖
𝒂𝒊  𝑔𝑖
ID𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖) 
Computes: 
  [𝐼𝐷𝑖−1] =  𝐴𝑖−1
𝑏𝑖−1𝑔𝑖−1
𝐼𝐷𝑖−2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑖−1) 
[𝐼𝐷𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅] = 𝐻(𝐼𝐷𝑖−1) 
𝐼𝐷𝑖
′ =  𝐴𝑖
𝒃𝒊  𝑔𝑖
[𝐼𝐷𝑖−1]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖)  
When 𝑏𝑖 is unknown, a probability to find the correct 𝐼𝐷𝑖 using brute force 
is 
1
22048
 such that 𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝐼𝐷𝑖
′. 
When probability to find 𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝐼𝐷𝑖
′ is negligible, then it will reflex a 
negligible correlation between 𝐼𝐷𝑖 and  𝐼𝐷𝑖−1. 
Therefore, 𝐼𝐷𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝐷𝑖−1 are independent and not related to each other. 
Security assumption: 1) Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem 
is hard in a cyclic group 𝐺 and 2) hash function is a universal one-way 
hash function with strong collision-resistant (Mohd Anuar Mat Isa et al., 
2015). 
Security argument: The session 𝐼𝐷𝑖 is secure against the key 
independence if and only if the adversary 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵 is not able to find 
𝐼𝐷𝑖  𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝐼𝐷𝑖 =  𝐼𝐷𝑖
′ with negligible advantage. 
 
D. Key Derivation Function Attack 
To prevent key derivation function attack, the session 
identity is hashed during message transfer and there is no 
relation between session identity and future session identity. 
When the public parameters   were known by an adversary, 
it cannot compute    or    . The adversary cannot break the 
identity because algebraic relations between session identity 
and future session identity are eliminated. Therefore, no 
correlation between session identity and future session 
identity. Formulation of adversary model: 
 
Adversary model: Key derivation function attack 
Adversary knowledge: 𝑃𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖 , 𝐴𝑖 , 𝐵𝑖 
Leaked secret knowledge: 𝒂𝒊, 𝒃𝒊, 𝑰𝑫𝒊−𝟏, 
Adversary limitation: The adversary cannot access secret parameters 𝐼𝐷𝑖 
because it convert to   𝐼𝐷𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ .  
Adversary goal: To find  𝑔𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ and 𝑔𝐼𝐷𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   
Adversary computation:  
To find 𝐼𝐷𝑖=1, Let i=1: 
𝑃𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖 , 𝐴𝑖 , 𝐵𝑖 , 𝐼𝐷𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ∈  ℤ𝑛=2048 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠
∗  
𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇 ∈  ℤ𝑛=𝑆𝐻𝐴3_256 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 
Either: 
𝐼𝐷𝑖 =  𝐴𝑖
𝒃𝒊  𝑔𝑖
ID𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖) or 
𝐼𝐷𝑖 =  𝐵𝑖
𝒂𝒊  𝑔𝑖
ID𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖) 
Computes: 
[𝐼𝐷𝑖
′] =  [𝐴𝑖
𝑏𝑖] 𝑔𝑖
ID𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖)  
When 𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇 is unknown, a probability to find the correct 𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇 using 
brute force is 
1
22048
 such that 𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝐼𝐷𝑖
′.  
To find 𝐼𝐷𝑖=2, Let i=2: 
𝑃𝑖−1, 𝑔𝑖−1, 𝐴𝑖−1, 𝐵𝑖−1, 𝐼𝐷𝑖−1, 𝑎𝑖−1, 𝑏𝑖−1 ∈  ℤ𝑛=2048 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠
∗  
𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑇 ∈  ℤ𝑛=𝑆𝐻𝐴3_256 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 
Either: 
𝐼𝐷𝑖 =  𝐴𝑖
𝒃𝒊  𝑔𝑖
ID𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖)  or 
𝐼𝐷𝑖 =  𝐵𝑖
𝒂𝒊  𝑔𝑖
𝑔ID𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖) 
Computes: 
 [𝐼𝐷𝑖] =  [𝐴𝑖
𝑏𝑖]𝑔𝑖
𝐼𝐷𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑖) 
𝐼𝐷𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝐻(𝐼𝐷𝑖)  
𝐼𝐷𝑖
′ =  𝐴𝑖
𝒃𝒊  𝑔𝑖
𝐼𝐷𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝑖)  
When 𝐼𝐷𝑖−1 is unknown, a probability to find the correct 𝐼𝐷𝑖 using brute 
force is 
1
22048
 such that 𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝐼𝐷𝑖
′. 
Security assumption: 1) Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem 
is hard in a cyclic group 𝐺 and 2) hash function is a universal one-way 
hash function with strong collision-resistant (Mohd Anuar Mat Isa et al., 
2015). 
Security argument: The session 𝐼𝐷𝑖 is secure against the session state 
revel attack if and only if the adversary 𝐴 is not able to find 
𝐼𝐷𝑖+1 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝐼𝐷𝑖+1 =  𝐼𝐷𝑖+1
′ with negligible advantage 
The Adversary advantages to mount the session state reveal attack, 
forward secrecy, key independence and key derivation function attack as 
below:  
Probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT)2 to determine value 0 or 1 for solving 
CDH hard problem in a random oracle model. 
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝐴
𝐶𝐷𝐻 = Pr [𝐴(𝑔, 𝑔𝑎 , 𝑔𝑏 , 𝑔𝐼𝐷, 𝑔𝑎𝑏𝐼𝐷)
= 1: (𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ ℤ𝑛=2048
∗  , 𝐼𝐷 ∈  ℤ𝑛=𝑆𝐻𝐴3256𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠)] 
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝐴
𝐶𝐷𝐻 is negligible based on the above security assumption. 
 
1 “polynomial-time” is a term used for measuring an algorithm’s running 
time as a function, wherein it is measured by length of its input into the 
function (Mohd Anuar Mat Isa et al., 2015). E.g. function 𝑓(𝑥) take 𝑥 =
2048 as input string during execution, then the running time is 𝑥. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
We present our chain identity method in preventing node 
cloning attack in wireless sensor network and we have 
succeeded to fulfill the objective and demonstrated 
cryptographic computation capability. We are assertive with 
the perfect forward secrecy attack model used to proof our 
new CIA attestation method. Future paper will present the 
analysis on the energy utilization and communication 
overhead.  
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